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INTRODUCTION 
Dr. Raphael Bostic argues that a phenomenon called the “social 
order dynamic” explains the negative effects on families of various 
past and current housing and land use policies.1  Dr. Bostic defines 
social order dynamic in the following way: sometimes policymakers 
adopt policies to maintain the urban economic order, but “because 
domains rarely operate in isolation, efforts to maintain order along 
one dimension can exacerbate conditions and increase disorder in 
others.”2  “Families, particularly those with low incomes, often live at 
the intersection of these conflicting forces,”3 and suffer negative 
effects because of such policies.  Dr. Bostic’s article (“the Article”) 
                                                                                                                 
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law.  Thanks to the 
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL’s editors. 
 1. See generally Raphael W. Bostic, Urban Policy and Families: How Concerns 
About Order Contribute to Familial Disorder, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969 (2016). 
 2. See id. at 969. 
 3. See id.  
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identifies examples of the social order dynamic, and then offers some 
suggestions for avoiding this dynamic or mitigating its effects, while 
still serving the original policy goal of maintaining the urban 
economic order. 
This response to the Article consists of four parts followed by a 
brief conclusion.  First, I clarify the Article’s thesis and operationalize 
the social order dynamic by clarifying its elements.  Second, I 
compare the Article’s examples of the social order dynamic with the 
refined definition of the social order dynamic.  Third, I explore the 
meaning of social order in the Article and its inextricable relationship 
to social welfare.  Fourth, in light of these discussions, I consider the 
Article’s proposed solutions to the problem and offer an alternative. 
I.  CLARIFYING THE THESIS AND OPERATIONALIZING THE “SOCIAL 
ORDER DYNAMIC” 
The Article aims to identify the social order dynamic as a distinct 
policymaking or governance problem: a situation in which 
policymakers adopt a particular policy to bring social order into one 
particular dimension of urban life (i.e., the economic one).4  This 
policy, however, has the unintended effect of causing disorder in the 
“family” dimension of social life through some kind of spillover 
effect.5  In other words, it is a problem of externalities6 applied to 
policymaking.  Because the Article invents a new phrase to name the 
problem it examines, I assume the problem is not just a standard 
application of the economic concept of externalities, nor is it just the 
traditional argument that every policy has unintended consequences.  
To follow and analyze the argument, it is necessary to flesh out the 
social order dynamic phenomenon—to make it operational and, 
therefore, testable. 
The Article views cities in economic terms as “the spatial 
realization of firms and households responding to” economic 
incentives to invest or to spend.7  “[T]he focus of order in this context 
is the preservation of conditions that permit for an efficient 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See id. at 970. 
 5. See id. at 970-71. 
 6. In traditional economic theory, “[e]xternalities occur when producing or 
consuming a good causes an impact on third parties not directly related to the 
transaction.” Tejvan Pettinger, Externalities–Definition, ECON. HELP (Nov. 28, 
2012), http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/externalities/ [https://perma.cc/
VCE6-X2UF]. 
 7. Bostic, supra note 1, at 972. “[U]rban places are primarily a locus of 
commerce.” Id. 
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functioning of urban markets, such that resources are primarily 
devoted to commerce and production.”8  This focus entails two goals: 
(1) limiting impediments to “establishing and operating businesses 
and buying and selling finished goods,”9 and (2) permitting “a 
maximal amount of private investment, so as to maximize the 
productive capacity of the regional economy.”10  In other words, the 
Article appears to embrace the standard economic view that 
governments create and maintain the conditions for well-functioning 
economic markets to maximize social welfare.  It explains that certain 
“urban disamenities” (e.g., crime) create disorder, that this disorder 
leads to both private and public outlays to address it, and that these 
expenditures are inefficient because they represent money that could 
have been used for more productive purposes.11 
At some point, these forms of disorder and the inefficient 
expenditures they elicit present “the risk that the costs of urbanizing 
exceed the benefits of urbanizing”12 (i.e. threaten the urban economic 
order).  For this reason, policymakers may seek to avoid or mitigate 
“private activities that increase social costs”13 and that interfere with 
the desired social order.  The focus of the Article is that these efforts 
by policymakers to maintain the desired social order (i.e., protect 
economic market functioning in urban areas) by reducing or 
eliminating externalities may themselves, unintentionally, impose 
negative effects on families.14  A further claim is that the negative 
impacts on families have a feedback loop that “can cause its own 
disorder and undermine the original intent” of the initial policy to 
maintain urban economic order.15 
The Article identifies three characteristics that define the social 
order dynamic as: 
[F]irst, one must be able to document that policymakers are focused 
on a single problem, and that the problem threatens social order in a 
fashion described above.  Second, and importantly, the policymaker 
must either not be aware of the potential that the policy solution will 
adversely affect families or are not (or less) concerned about those 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See id. at 973-74. 
 9. Id. at 974. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. at 972-73. 
 12. Id. at 973. 
 13. See id. at 972. 
 14. The Article distinguishes policies that seek to protect market functioning 
(economic social order maintenance) from policies aimed at redistribution or equity. 
See id. at 971-75. 
 15. See id. at 975. 
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adverse effects.  Finally, the policy choices made to maintain social 
order . . . must impose observable negative costs for families.16 
Using the Article’s analysis, I think it is more analytically accurate 
and useful to parse the characteristics into four as follows: first, 
policymakers were only interested in addressing a single problem 
(e.g., crime).  Second, their concern about that problem is that it 
threatens the urban economic order; and the sole or primary objective 
of the policy is to maintain the urban economic order by means of 
addressing the problem that threatens it.  Third, policymakers were 
either unaware of the policy’s possible negative impact on families, or 
not concerned or less concerned about those possible effects than 
about their goal of maintaining the urban economic order.  Fourth, 
these policies that are intended to promote social order in the 
intended single dimension of the urban economic order cause 
observable negative effects on families by spilling over into, and 
causing disorder in, what might be called the “family dimension.”17 
My parsing of the necessary characteristics divides the Article’s 
first characteristic into two.  The rationale behind this division is that 
claiming a policy has a single focal point as the target of its action is 
quite distinct from articulating that the concern behind the policy is 
that the problem threatens a desired social order. 
II.  TESTING THE ARTICLE’S EXAMPLES AGAINST THE “SOCIAL 
ORDER DYNAMIC” PARADIGM 
The social order dynamic is a complex hypothesis because it has 
four required characteristics.  Further, it makes important 
assumptions about social life.  The Article offers numerous examples 
of the social order dynamic at work.  This Part argues that considering 
the information given in the Article, none of the proffered examples 
actually meet all of the criteria. 
The Article acknowledges that its thesis depends upon one being 
“able to document” that the challenged act of governance meets the 
characteristics of the social order dynamic.18  For this reason, it seems 
fair to test the relationship between the characteristics of the social 
order dynamic and the examples offered in the Article. 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id. at 974-75. 
 17. As discussed more thoroughly in Part III, the Article assumes that there are 
several distinct dimensions or domains that collectively comprise human experience. 
Id.  The Article appears to use the terms “dimensions” and “domains” as synonyms. 
See, e.g., id. at 970.  The Article appears to consider the economic order as distinct 
from a dimension in which families live.  
 18. Id. at 974. 
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Upon a close analysis, none of the examples fit all of the criteria 
completely, or at least it is impossible to confirm that any examples 
completely fit the social order dynamic paradigm because the Article 
does not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that all of the 
criteria are met.  And, in some cases, the information the Article 
provides or is otherwise available to this author conflicts with one or 
more of the criteria.  While each of the policies the Article discusses 
contains one or a few characteristics of the social order dynamic, 
there is a mismatch between the social order dynamic and the policy 
examples discussed in the Article.  The only characteristic that every 
example meets is the fourth one—that the policy caused negative 
impacts on families. 
The Article offers three historical examples from federal housing 
policy and three contemporary housing policy examples.  This 
response considers how well each of them meet the four 
characteristics defined above. 
The Article describes the establishment of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank system, the Home Owners Loan Corporation, and the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) as focused on “stabilizing the 
banking industry, mortgages, and the housing market” and serving to 
“reduce social disorder”19 in response to the Great Depression.  
While this example arguably meets the last two characteristics (i.e., 
the policies “were of limited use for renters and lower-income 
families”),20 it fails on the first two.  Certainly these institutions were 
created to reduce social disorder and to support an economic order, 
but the social order in view was not a single problem but rather a 
massive multifaceted complex of problems from unemployment to 
foreclosure.  Additionally, the economic order in view was not 
specifically or exclusively the urban economy (which is the Article’s 
focus) but the national economy. 
The Article asserts that “the early-years policies of the [Federal 
Housing Administration] represent a classic example of the social 
order dynamic.”21  It describes the FHA’s infamous redlining policies 
that “only extend[ed] loans to minority families in specific 
neighborhoods, mainly those with already large minority 
populations.”22  The Article suggests redlining was adopted “[i]n the 
name of preserving social order—blacks were thought to adversely 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 977. 
 20. Id. at 977-98. 
 21. Id. at 978. 
 22. Id. 
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impact property values.”23  This example conflates the first two 
characteristics.  The “single problem” being addressed, namely, 
blacks living in the same neighborhoods as whites, turns out to be the 
same as the overall primary goal of maintaining economic order due 
to the belief that “blacks were thought to adversely impact property 
values.”24  This merging of the problem—that under the Article’s 
thesis is a phenomenon separate from the economic order—and the 
economic order itself being fostered renders this example opaque; 
redlining was itself an economic policy.  On the third characteristic, 
this seems a clear case of policymakers being less concerned about the 
adverse effects on black families.  It clearly meets the fourth 
characteristic as the historical record is clear that the policy 
“significantly hindered the ability of minority families to access 
neighborhoods with strong amenities, thereby limiting their ability to 
increase affluence and improve their quality of life.”25 
The Article offers the National Housing Act of 1949 as an 
additional historical example of the social order dynamic.26  The 
Article argues that “urban renewal efforts clearly fit the 
framework,”27 specifying the slum removal provision of Title I of the 
National Housing Act of 1949 itself.  This proposed example elides 
the first and second characteristics of the social order dynamic 
because the specific policy that purports to be focused on solving a 
single problem (namely, the slum removal provision) is part of a 
larger statute with many purposes, including economic ones.  While 
the degree to which the policymakers considered the negative effects 
on minority families can be argued, the disproportionate negative 
effects on these families referenced in the Article are indisputable.28 
The first contemporary example of the social order dynamic is the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) 
policy that “if a member of a family receiving rental assistance is 
arrested and convicted of a drug-related or other crime, the entire 
family loses its assistance under most circumstances.”29  While this 
example meets the first characteristic, because the policy was clearly 
enacted to address the problem of crime, it fails the second 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 978-79. 
 27. Id. at 980. 
 28. Id. at 978-81. 
 29. Id. at 981 (citing HUD Denial of Admission and Termination of Assistance 
for Criminals and Alcohol Abusers, 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a) (2010)). 
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characteristic because, on the Article’s own account, this policy’s 
primary goal was to protect the health and safety of public housing 
residents.30  While the Article briefly implies that concerns about 
economic order must have been “a major driver” of this policy 
because the public housing program involves billions of dollars,31 the 
Article does not offer any evidence for this assertion.  If the 
maintenance of urban economic order is the primary motive and goal 
of the policy, as the social order dynamic contends, one would expect 
that this goal would be evident in the policy’s express justifications.  
This example, as with all of the policies offered as examples, does 
meet the fourth characteristic because the Article provides solid 
evidence that the policy imposed disproportionate negative impacts 
on minority families, especially black families.32 
As its second contemporary example, the Article offers “the 
interaction of two policies . . . housing assistance and school 
assignment.”33  While the Article convincingly demonstrates that the 
consequences of these policies negatively affect lower-income 
families,34 this example is a particularly stark mismatch with the social 
order dynamic hypothesis precisely because this example considers 
the interaction between two policies, one federal and one local, and 
not a policy with a single goal that is enacted primarily to maintain 
order in the urban economy. 
The final example offered is the common local land use policy of 
limiting a parcel in a “single family zone” to a single residential unit 
which has the effect of excluding accessory units (also known as 
secondary units, in-law units, or granny flats).35  Again, the Article 
itself demonstrates that this example does not fit the first 
characteristic of the social order dynamic by explaining that this 
policy is not aimed at a single problem but several, namely to 
“prevent the development of informal residences that could 
transform the neighborhood into a shanty town,” to prevent “crime 
and other illegal activities,” and “limiting the total population in a 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 985 (citing HUD Denial of Admission and Termination of Assistance 
for Criminals and Alcohol Abusers, 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a) (2010)) (explaining “the 
intent of these provisions” as “so that residents in their communities can also live in 
peace.”). 
 31. Id. at 986. 
 32. See id. at 979. 
 33. Id. at 988. 
 34. Id. at 991-92. 
 35. Id. at 993-94. 
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neighborhood” to prevent overwhelming demands on existing 
infrastructure.36 
This example also fails the second characteristic.  While the Article 
cites some evidence for the view that single family zoning was 
intended to serve urban economic order,37 Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty38 and Palo Alto Tenants’ Union v. Morgan39—two 
cases cited by the Article—articulated a wide range of public 
purposes underlying the creation of single family zoning, including 
the general welfare of the community and the “integrity of traditional 
families.”40  Moreover, the plaintiffs in Euclid claimed that 
comprehensive zoning, including the single family element, 
undermined the regional economy by inappropriately interfering with 
natural economic development.41  As with all of the Article’s 
examples, the negative effects of the policy on some families are well 
documented. 
Many, if not most, policies enacted by legislatures attempt to 
promote several goals, not just one.  To show that the policies the 
Article offers as examples were only focused on one goal would 
require references to both the legislative findings and policies sections 
of statutes themselves articulating a single goal as well as to legislative 
history to confirm the single-minded intent of the policymakers.  But, 
the Article does not provide such evidence.  Rather it offers plausible 
policy reasons for each policy without giving a complete account.  
Frequently, policies claim to improve “general welfare” which cannot 
be equated to “urban economic order,” even if a thriving urban 
economy is likely to be part of general welfare.  At most there is some 
evidence of economic motivation in all of the examples, but on the 
information provided, this economic interest is not necessarily 
directed toward promoting the efficient functioning of an urban 
economy, much less directed toward the economic details that the 
Article identifies (e.g., promoting investment).42 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 993. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding comprehensive zoning did not violate the federal 
Constitution). 
 39. 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding the constitutionality of single-family 
zoning ordinances). 
 40. Bostic, supra note 1, at 996. 
 41. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 385 (alleging that the ordinance “has the effect of 
diverting the normal industrial, commercial and residential development [of the 
region].”). 
 42. Bostic supra note 1, at 974. 
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And some policies do not appear to be aimed at maintaining the 
urban economic order.  For example, the Article characterizes local 
housing codes regulating the quality of housing conditions as “clearly 
motivated by a desire to maintain order,”43 but then the Article itself 
identifies the concerns behind those policies as “public health 
implications of the slums and the moral character of their 
residents.”44  In the next Part, I discuss how this policy and several 
others described in the Article seek not to maintain a social order, 
much less to help maintain the then existing urban economic order, 
but to change the existing social order to serve certain social and 
moral goals. 
While the social order dynamic may explain the negative effects of 
some policies in some contexts, I am not persuaded that the examples 
offered in the Article fit this paradigm.  Clearly, all of the policies had 
negative effects on at least some families, but the Article does not 
offer persuasive evidence or argument that the social order dynamic 
is the best explanation for how and why these policies had such 
negative effects.  Because all of the policies had negative effects on 
families, the examples may fit the more traditional critiques of 
policy—that all policies have unintended consequences or 
externalities—rather than the social order dynamic as a particular, 
newly-identified phenomenon that is the focus of the Article.  In the 
next Part, I discuss how the policies consistently serve certain 
families’ interests but not those of other families.  This suggests that 
these examples are more consistent with critiques of urban policy as 
racist and classist. 
III.  PROBING “SOCIAL ORDER” AND ITS INEXTRICABLE 
RELATIONSHIP TO “SOCIAL WELFARE” 
Obviously, social order is a critical concept at the heart of the 
Article.45  Given that, it would be helpful to spell out more of what is 
being referenced and to make some distinctions.  This Part argues 
that the Article’s conception of social order is incomplete or 
confused, at least in part, because it fails to acknowledge that any 
conception of social order is intertwined with a notion of social 
welfare.  The Article’s reliance on an economic social order carries 
that model’s assumptions with it, but the author’s concerns seem to 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 976-77. 
 44. Id. at 976. 
 45. “The overarching thesis of this analysis is that many urban policies primarily 
focus on maintaining social order . . . .” Id. at 970.  
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place him in an odd relationship to the traditional economic model, 
including by postulating the existence of a distinct “family order” and 
by his attention to equity issues.  Finally, given the diversity of 
families and their distinct economic and social baselines, this Part 
questions the Article’s implicit assumption that a policy can serve the 
apparently monolithic “family order.” 
As the prior Part demonstrated, it is not clear that most of these 
policies are aimed at any identifiable single “domain.”  Nor is it 
obvious that “families” are a cognizably different “sphere” or domain 
from urban economics.  To support the Article’s thesis persuasively, it 
needs a general social theory to underpin this analysis that would 
explain the relationship between the economy and other dimensions, 
such as a family dimension, as the Article envisions.46 
More fundamentally, what is social order?  Of course, like any 
other concept there can be many understandings.  In this author’s 
view, in a world of people with diverse views of the good life and 
distinct interests, there is no possible social order that is value-free or 
value-neutral.  Social order only makes sense in a more concrete 
application: social order for whom?  Social order always serves a 
more or less clear concept of social welfare.  The Article 
acknowledges that an efficient market economy as a social order 
seeks to “maximize income and wealth in the economy” but “do[es] 
not ensure that [wealth and income] are distributed such that 
everyone receives enough to achieve a minimum quality of life.”47  I 
would go further and argue that every actual social order favors the 
values and interests of some groups and disfavors others.  Even a thin 
concept of social order as merely “maintaining stability” favors the 
interests of whoever benefits from the status quo. 
All policies are intended in some measure to promote some 
conception of social welfare.  And any conception of social welfare 
relies, at least implicitly, on some conception of social order necessary 
or sufficient to enable it.  The two concepts are interdependent.  The 
critical issue is what conception of social welfare are the policies 
promoting?  And what view of social order do they think is needed 
(or best) to get there? 
The Article contends that the policies are geared to promoting an 
urban economic order.  Unfortunately, beyond a general articulation 
of promoting investment and reducing costs in urban markets, the 
                                                                                                                 
 46. My understanding of the dominant school of contemporary economics (the 
neoclassical or Chicago School Economics) would not provide such a theory. 
 47. Bostic, supra note 1, at 971-72. 
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Article omits a more complete description of the content of the social 
order being promoted by the policies it examines.  The traditional 
economic theory upon which the Article relies includes both a version 
of a preferred social order (i.e., efficient markets) and a version of 
social welfare (i.e., the individualistic consumption of resources to 
fulfill preferences) that such order serves.  The Article’s reliance on 
this theory is curious because traditional economic theory is typically 
uninterested in distributional consequences or “equity,”48 yet all of 
the negative consequences on families that the Article identifies are 
distributional in nature. 
Upon careful consideration of the examples that the Article offers, 
a clear pattern emerges of what conception of social welfare is behind 
the social order being promoted.  Generally, none of the policies were 
“anti-family” per se in that they harmed all families.  Nor were they 
arbitrary policies that were blind to their effects on families.  Rather, 
each of the policies were directly aimed at promoting a classist and/or 
racist conception of social order that served the interests of some 
families at the cost of the interests of other families.  Specifically, they 
served middle and upper class white families while harming lower-
income families and families of color. 
It appears undisputed that the FHA’s intentionally discriminatory 
redlining policies served the interests of white families but not 
families of color.49  Urban renewal and slum removal provisions 
predictably served white and middle class families over those of low-
income families and families of color.  The limitation on formerly 
incarcerated people living in public housing mostly negatively affects 
African American families and communities.50  And, a great deal of 
literature has argued that single family zoning districts had a clear 
socio-economic social order in mind.51  This should not be a surprising 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See Dr. Bostic’s distinction between efficiency and equity, noting “[t]he 
redistribution need arises because competitive markets maximize income and wealth 
in the economy but do not ensure that they are distributed such that everyone 
receives enough to achieve a minimum quality of life.  Thus, those concerned with 
equity might find that the distribution of resources across families is suboptimal and 
look to policy to improve the situation.” Id. 
 49. Id. at 978 (“In the name of preserving social order-blacks were thought to 
adversely impact property values-the FHA instituted a policy whereby it would only 
extend loans to minority families in specific neighborhoods, mainly those with 
already large minority populations.”) (citations omitted). 
 50. Id. at 988 (commenting that because a large percentage of African Americans 
are incarcerated, “[t]his suggests that the individual impacts discussed above are 
being felt at a large scale”). 
 51. See, e.g., Martha A. Lees, Preserving Property Values? Preserving Proper 
Homes? Preserving Privilege?: The Pre-Euclid Debate Over Zoning for Exclusively 
1198 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
finding.  Urban land use and housing policy has often been criticized 
as being deployed to create or maintain a classist and racist social 
order.52 
The Article’s examples amount to a critique of housing and other 
urban policy as consistently biased to serve the interests of white and 
middle- or upper-income families, despite the Article’s qualification 
that “very few policymakers have goals that are actively pernicious to 
families, particularly lower-income families.”53 
The Article implicitly raises the fundamental question: is it possible 
to have a single coherent, consistent family-friendly policy in 
housing?  As the Article notes, there are different kinds of families: 
low- and moderate-income, minority and white, homeowners and 
renters, nuclear families and intergenerational families, traditional 
families and non-traditional families.54  In fact, “family” itself can be 
defined differently, and it appears that families in the United States 
are getting more diverse.  Each of these families has different, 
sometimes conflicting, interests regarding housing and other goods.  
In other words, families’ interests in housing are generally not 
monolithic.  Therefore, an analysis should not essentialize families: 
different families have different interests and they conflict, so some 
policies serve “families” but not all families.  Perhaps no policy can 
serve all types of families.  Perhaps the Article’s implicit assumption 
that policies aimed at maintaining urban economic order could be 
expected to serve all families equally is naïve.  Probably most policies 
will have diverse effects on different kinds of families, both because 
of the baseline of their wealth, income, and other measures of well-
being, based upon prior policies, and because of their current needs 
and interests. 
                                                                                                                 
Private Residential Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. PITT. L. REV.  367, 375-76 (1994). See 
generally INTEGRATING SPACES: PROPERTY LAW AND RACE (Alfred Brophy et al. 
eds., 2011).  Notably, the judge in the district court opinion in the Euclid case that 
was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court found it obvious that comprehensive zoning 
was a form of socio-economic engineering. See Amber Realty Co. v. Village of 
Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924). 
 52. See, e.g., Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for 
Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 553-65 (2007) (arguing that “housing as 
providing social order” is one important frame for understanding housing law and 
policy). 
 53. See Bostic, supra note 1, at 1006. 
 54. A more complete list of family diversity would include the following: 
traditional “nuclear” families versus non-traditional families; intergenerational 
families; families of different and mixed “races;” families of different levels of income 
and wealth; renters and homeowners; immigrants and current citizens or legalized 
residents; families living in urban, suburban and rural areas; families with members in 
prison and families without members in prison, etc. 
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In conclusion, these policies are better explained by the particular 
conception of “social welfare” that the policymakers had in mind 
(consciously or unconsciously) than by the social order dynamic.  
More information about the origin of these policies—both the stated 
justifications and a more complete contextualized historical account—
could reveal hidden or even unconscious reasons why these policies 
were enacted. 
IV.  SOLVING THE GOVERNANCE PROBLEM WITH A “FAMILY 
IMPACT STATEMENT” POLICY 
The Article purports to identify the social order dynamic as a 
particular kind of governance problem.55  This Part first argues that 
while the Article does not convincingly identify the social order 
dynamic as a novel governance problem, its proposed solutions are 
still valuable.  Second, the examples discussed in the Article do reveal 
a different governance problem—the systematic favoring of middle 
class white families’ interests over those of lower-income families of 
color in urban and housing policy.  And, third, a “family impact 
statement” could be a politically practical and effective solution to 
that governance problem. 
Despite my conclusion that the Article’s examples do not actually 
exemplify the social order problem, it appears to me that solutions 
that the Article proposes would likely mitigate the social order 
dynamic problem to the degree it exists.56  In fact, the proposals—
such as sharing information, incentives for coordination, and avoiding 
over-specialization—aimed at promoting better policy making by 
avoiding narrow and parochial mindsets are eminently reasonable 
and very useful, even if not based on the Article’s problem analysis. 
While the Article initially identifies the social order dynamic as the 
governance problem, it later nods to certain political realities as the 
more fundamental cause of the inequities that are the focus of its 
concern. Specifically, it states: 
[P]olicy makers prioritize social order over the well-being of lower-
income families, who often are not their main constituents.  Their 
only attention to such populations is in the context of problems, and 
so they are disinclined to give priority until they become such a large 
problem that ignoring them becomes impossible . . . .  This is 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Bostic, supra note 1, at 974-75 (describing the social order dynamic as a 
problem of policy-making) and at 1002 (offering solutions to this governance 
problem). 
 56. See id. at 999-1004 (discussing the Article’s proposed solutions to the social 
order dynamic). 
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exacerbated by realities of political campaigns, in which wealthier 
interests who typically have the most to gain by preserving and 
enforcing social order are the main financiers of elected officials.57 
In other words, the reason policymakers address the problems they 
do in the way they do is because they view their political interests as 
being best served by taking care of relatively wealthy and regularly 
involved constituents (read: white and middle class families).  In this 
sense, the policies the Article discusses and their effects do derive 
from a governance problem, but a much more commonly recognized 
one: that our elected officials serve the needs and interests of the 
people they perceive as their primary constituents, sometimes called 
the capture of elected officials by well-organized and funded 
interests.58 
To the degree that social order dynamic and this governance 
problem exist, a “Family Impact Statement” (FIS) modeled on the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)59 may be the best 
realistic solution.  This type of policy aims to prevent or mitigate the 
likely negative effects of policies on a favored domain (e.g., the 
environment) by forcing the production of certain information about 
the likely negative effects of a proposed policy, requiring public 
consideration of these effects before the policy is enacted, and 
enabling the revision of a proposed policy to eliminate or reduce the 
negative effects through this public examination.60  This type of 
regulation is already widely in use in the environmental and health 
realms.61  While NEPA imposes a national requirement, many states 
have enacted their own equivalent laws.62 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 1006. 
 58. “According to the broad interpretation, regulatory capture is the process 
through which special interests affect state intervention in any of its forms.” Ernesto 
Dal Bo, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, 203, 203 
(2006). 
 59. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2012). 
 60. Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State 
Housing Regulation While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 435-436 (2003) 
(describing how NEPA works). 
 61. For an analysis of the use of impact statements in the environmental context, 
see SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (Stan. Univ. Press 
1984).  For a discussion of health impact statements, see CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/healthyplaces/hia.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3285-5UYH]. 
 62. For a discussion of NEPA and state equivalents, see Iglesias, supra note 60, at 
435-36. 
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There are several reasons to believe that an FIS would both be 
politically feasible and effective in considering and serving the needs 
and interests of diverse families.  This kind of policy has a strong 
theoretical grounding in the “reflexive law” tradition.63  Such a policy 
is consistent with the Article’s argument because it would incorporate 
a procedural step in the policymaking process to specifically consider 
potential negative effects on families thereby preventing or mitigating 
any adverse consequences of the social order dynamic.64  And, 
Professor Clare Huntington’s book, Failure to Flourish, which 
provides the conceptual backdrop for this Colloquium, points to (but 
does not develop) this suggestion.65  Indeed some versions of a family 
impact analysis are already being used in some jurisdictions and by 
some organizations.66 
One reason why this type of regulation may be politically realistic 
in the current difficult policy realm is because it does not prescribe a 
particular outcome or policy choice.  Rather, it only requires the 
production, distribution, and consideration of relevant information on 
the potential significant impacts of a policy on what the Article calls a 
particular domain or dimension.  In a democracy rooted in liberal 
rationalism, it is hard to oppose a requirement for the provision and 
consideration of relevant information.67  The fact recognized by the 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See id. at 496-501.  In that article, I proposed such a solution to housing 
affordability and other housing problems. Id.  Housing impact statements are now 
becoming popular. See generally Brentin Mock, The Growing Trend of Affordable 
Housing Impact Statements, CITYLAB (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/housing/
2016/01/the-growing-trend-of-affordable-housing-impact-statements/423333/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q6V9-UJ2Z]. 
 64. “[C]onsistent creation of policies that do not suffer from the ‘social order 
dynamic’, in which policies are pursued to create and maintain social order without 
making allowances for collateral impacts, requires attention to the issue and a policy-
making infrastructure that creates incentives for decision-makers to do so.” Bostic, 
supra note 1, at 1007. 
 65. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES 
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 184-85 (2014). 
 66. See, e.g., MARCIA G. ORY, POLICY AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY: A MANUAL 
FOR FAMILY IMPACT ANALYSIS (1978); Marcia G. Ory, Family Impact Analysis: 
Concepts and Methodologies, 8 POL’Y STUD. J. 941 (1980); Theodora Ooms, Taking 
Families Seriously: Family Impact Analysis as an Essential Policy Tool, 
https://www.purdue.edu/hhs/hdfs/fii/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/pf_fis02supp
report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XBM-N5HA]; A Checklist for Assessing the Impact of 
Policies on Families, Policy Institute for Family Impact Seminars, 
http://aces.nmsu.edu/ces/familyimpactseminar/documents/family-impact-checklist.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5RT4-Z24P]. See generally FAM. IMPACT INST., PURDUE UNIV., 
https://www.purdue.edu/hhs/hdfs/fii/hello-world/ [https://perma.cc/QJ9B-DBHE]. 
 67. Of course, there are debates about the actual relevance of information 
produced in environmental impact statements and the relative benefits compared to 
the costs. 
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Article that revising policies already in place is slow and difficult68 is 
further support for family impact statements because, if effective, 
they would prevent policies with significant negative effects on 
families from being enacted in the first place. 
An FIS would also be helpful to respond to the historical problem 
of lower-income and minority families suffering negative effects of 
urban policies documented by the Article.  Given the past policies 
and current economic situation of lower-income and minority 
families, even explicitly and intentionally “pro-family” urban policies 
will have different actual effects on different families.  By producing 
information about the impact of a proposed policy on the whole range 
of families and requiring a public discussion about this information, 
the FIS would require the production of information that would not 
otherwise have been created or assembled (e.g., about the disparity of 
impacts between different kinds of families).  The availability and 
dissemination of such information could promote a more thoughtful 
and careful public debate about the balancing of costs and benefits to 
different types of families.  Given the enhanced awareness about the 
negative effects of past policies (as the Article demonstrates), an FIS 
has the potential to avoid a repeat of these awful results. 
The diversity of actual families’ needs and interests is both a reason 
supporting the need for an FIS and a potential limit to its efficacy.  In 
addition, the “culture wars context” regarding families would 
certainly complicate any actual use of FIS.  For example, New 
Urbanist policies69 (which are endorsed in Failure to Flourish70) have 
been opposed by conservatives as overly intrusive government 
intervention in the private lives of families as well as overregulation 
of private property rights.71  Because of the varied and conflicting 
interests of the wide range of types of families, some skepticism about 
whether there can be a single coherent, consistent family-friendly 
policy in housing is justified.72 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Bostic, supra note 1, at 999. 
 69. “As an alternative to sprawling development, New Urbanism encourages the 
development of compact, urban, walkable, diverse, and sustainable communities that 
promote a sense of connectedness among residents.  New Urbanism preserves the 
traditional neighborhood structure, with a large central public space, a range of 
homes, shops and businesses within a ten-minute walking distance, and physically 
attractive surroundings and architecture intended to create a sense of enjoyment and 
belonging for residents.” HUNTINGTON, supra note 65, at 182. 
 70. Id. at 180-82. 
 71. See, e.g., Rick Henderson & Adrian T. Moore, Plan Obsolescence, REASON, 
June 1998, at 42. 
 72. One possibility is policies that enable housing stability.  The Article does nice 
work in gathering several studies about the value of housing stability.  Whether 
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Of course, much of the efficacy of an FIS would depend upon how 
it was designed and implemented.73  Importantly, the traditional 
impact statement-type regulation does not require policymakers to 
enact a policy that has no harmful effects on the subject population.  
Rather, if they decide to enact a policy that will have negative effects, 
they are required to draft and adopt a statement explaining why they 
are going forward despite the negative impacts.74  In other words, 
they could not pass a policy that has negative impacts without at least 
an awareness of the negative effects as they might have done in the 
past.  This means that an FIS would not necessarily improve the 
results of urban policies for lower-income and minority families.  
However, the explicit recognition by decision-makers of their 
knowledge of the tradeoffs that they are making may provide a 
certain sense of satisfaction, and possibly even political 
accountability. 
The other benefit of an FIS requirement to lower-income and 
minority families is that it provides a formal, guaranteed opportunity 
for them to assert their interests and views about how potential 
tradeoffs in a proposed policy will affect them.  They will have an 
opportunity to oppose or attempt to revise a harmful policy before it 
is enacted.  This benefit responds to the Article’s acknowledgment 
that lower-income and minority families are often not an integral part 
of the policymaking process.75  However, the actual value of this 
opportunity is integrally dependent upon that community’s capacity 
to organize itself to participate effectively in the political process so 
that it can take advantage of the opportunity.  This capacity is at least 
partially dependent upon the economic, social, and political resources 
of this community.  Therefore, there is something of a catch-22 
involved.  If these communities are already disempowered in part due 
to prior policies that negatively affected them, they are less able to 
take advantage of this new opportunity.  The Article’s explicit 
recognition that wealth has a disproportionate impact in urban 
                                                                                                                 
having the opportunity for “housing stability” is a commonly shared interest of all 
families is an open question worth investigating. 
 73. For an analysis of factors that contribute to the efficacy of this kind of 
regulation, see Iglesias, supra note 60, at 472-74. 
 74. See, e.g., Guideline 15093 for the California Environmental Quality Act, 14 
Cal. Code Regs. §§ 15080-15097, http://resources.ca.gov/ceqa/guidelines/art7.html 
[https://perma.cc/VS3R-R69H] (enabling an agency to adopt a “Statement of 
Overriding Consideration” if it elects to approve a project that will have significant 
but unmitigated environmental impacts). 
 75. Bostic, supra note 1, at 1006. 
1204 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
policymaking highlights this limitation on the actual value of an FIS 
requirement.76 
So, while an FIS requirement would probably be a good policy that 
is consistent with the argument and analysis in Failure to Flourish, it 
is important to recognize that it would not be a cure-all.77  It promotes 
information-gathering, conversation, and debate—all of which are 
appropriate where interests of different families may diverge—but it 
does not change the current balance of economic and political power 
in a community.  It only creates a possibility of better policies through 
better information and public debate. 
CONCLUSION 
I am open to the possibility that the social order dynamic the 
Article describes does occur in some contexts and that the suggested 
solutions are valuable things to improve our policy-making and 
governance.  However, I think these points are only loosely related to 
the particular housing policies the Article analyzes.  Even if the social 
order dynamic exists, it is not clear how common or important it is in 
explaining how and why so many housing and land use policies 
regularly harm some families, especially low-income families and 
people of color.  To the degree that the social order dynamic or some 
variation of it is a problem, the best solution would be a “family 
impact statement” policy. 
There is some indication in the Article that its focus on the social 
order dynamic hopes to avoid hard conversations about equity by 
framing the problem as a governance issue based upon the social 
order dynamic.  I believe we cannot avoid the equity issue by focusing 
on the social order dynamic as a governance issue; rather, because 
social order and a conception of social welfare are inextricably linked, 
we must wrestle with the equity issues directly.  An FIS requirement 
would create the occasion for such conversations.  And this solution 
would be more efficacious if participants can learn to “talk purple,” 
that is, in ways that transcend current cultural wars, as Professor 
Huntington recommends.78 
 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. This discussion is consistent with the recognition of the “limits of flourishing 
family law” in FAILURE TO FLOURISH. HUNTINGTON, supra note 65, at 203-21.  
Professor Huntington recognizes three types of limits: political resistance, the limits 
of application, and limits of what law can actually do. Id. 
 78. Id. at 211-14. 
